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THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING UNCONSCIOUS 
OF THE PROCESSES WITHIN THE LIMITS 
OF THE SECOND SIGNAL SYSTEM
VI. Ivanov
The state of being unconscious is usually considered from the viewpoints 
of depth psychology, by relating it with the instinctive life of man. The 
purpose of the present work is to demonstrate, on material obtained by way 
of experimental pathopsychological studies, the role played by external 
influences on the formation of categories and performing reasonable (mind­
ful) and practical acts, remaining beyond the field of clear consciousness. 
It is commonly believed that the latter phenomenon occurs in the so-called 
automatized acts, wherein the consciously elaborated, with maximal con­
centration of attention, working or other habit is gradually released from 
the control of conscious volition, with the latter participating merely in 
the calling into action (starting), respectively checking mechanism (act). 
Our investigations assume the task to elucidate the problem of the possibi­
lity for “ non-participation”  of consciousness in the process of producing 
complex conditioned-conditioned reflexes within the limits of the second 
signal system.
We studied a series comprising 230 patients affected with schizophrenia 
in various stages of the disease, but with active psychotic production. A 
method suggested by the author and elaborated in six variants was resorted 
to for the production of conditioned reflexes in patients; in four of the va­
riants the conditioned reflex is not produced by a specific stimulant, but 
by generalization of a group of stimuli, i. e. by the notion including 
all stimuli referred to. In the most complicated variant, a complex condi­
tioned-conditioned reflex is concerned which should be fully developed 
within the limits of the second signal system. The experimentator suggests 
to the subject examined an “ arbitrary”  answer to the words pronounced by 
him, with one of two possible words — for instance, denominations of mu­
sical tones, interjections and the like. A series of 30 verbal signals are fed, 
part of which might be unified in one, and another part — in a different idea 
(for example, animals and plants). The examinee should associate each of 
these notions to one of the indifferent words (in accordance with a program, 
previously formulated (drafted) by the experimentator). Following each 
verbal reaction, a verbal support is prompted (“ right”  or “ incorrect” ). In 
our opinion, the background of the experiment thus outlined in fact, repre­
sents a physiological pattern of inductive conclusion. In the remaining 
variant?, the investigation is rendered simpler, passing to concrete-image 
stimuli, whilst in some of them the responsive verbal-expressive reaction 
is substituted for an ordinary motor reaction.
Merely 30 patients of the series investigated produce correctly condition­
ed reflexes with all the variants. Most of the schizophr enic patients produce
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temporary associations at a lower level merely, although occasionally, the 
reverse phenomenon is also observed. However, in our case, merely the 
problem about being conscious of the conditioned reflexes is dealt with. 
Disorders in this respect were recorded in 65 patients.
It is well known from the studies of A. G. Ivanov-Smolenskyi and his 
school that impaired faculty of being conscious is possible equally insofar 
the newly developed conditioned reflex is concerned, as a whole, and of 
its separate components (stimulant, reaction and interrelationship between 
them) as well. Investigations on the erroneous verbal account have been 
reported, apart by A. G. Ivanov-Smolenskyi (2), also by N. N. Zaharova 
(1), Y. A. Povorinskyi (3), P. G. Smetannikov (4) and many others. In all 
the listed studies however, the production of comparatively simple condi­
tioned reflexes is concerned, with utilization of elementary first signal sti­
muli and simple motor response reaction. Hence, the investigation of these 
processes at the level o f the second signal system represents particular in­
terest, i. e. using verbal stimuli and verbal-expressive reactions.
Wit l our material five different variants are observed of impaired inter­
relationships between the first and second signal system, resp. between the 
different properties of the complicated stimulus and its complex (total) 
image, which in certain aspects correspond to the developmental stages of 
the conditioned reflex production and conscious perception.
First of all, awareness (conscious perception) of the conditioned stimulus 
proper occurs with its comprehension ad integrum and association to the 
corresponding logical category. The conscious perception is related by rule 
with reference of the ideal sensitive-perceptive image to a higher degree of 
cognition. Insofar the second signal stimulus is concerned, the real, complete 
conscious perception consists not in associating the verbal image to the 
concrete impressive image, but rather in its association with the corresponding 
notion. Doubtlessly, this by no means precludes a process of elective irradia­
tion from the second to the first signal system which, by rule, exists and 
is likewise absolutely indispensable for the correct course of the cognitive 
(gnostic) process.
The subjects investigated are in a position in some instances (in 16 of 
our series) to be conscious of the stimulus — verbal or concretely imaginative 
(i. e. merely the afferent tract of the reflex arch), comprising also the achie­
vement of its notional generalization regardless of whether or not a condi­
tioned reflex was developed. In another group (15 patients) conscious per­
ception occurs not of the essence of the complex stimulus as a whole, but 
rather of individual properties of the same:'a generalization is developed 
exactly of these properties without reaching to the formation of the correspond­
ing idea (for animals this is usually the property mobility, for living crea­
tures in general — growth, for domestic needs utility and the like). It 
is rather difficult to reach a decision in these cases whether the temporary 
association is established merely with the individual property or else the 
production of a notion results which remains as unrelated, outside the 
field of clear consciossness.
In 20 patients the conscious perception of the conditioned reflex as a whole 
was impaired. Irrespective of the impeccable reaction, the verbal account 
in some of them was entirely impossible, whereas in others — incorrect. 
In the latter case, usually, the correct assessment of the stimulus proper
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suffered as well as the relationship between the same and the response react­
ion. Mcst frequently, Ihe impairment referred to was noted in genera­
lization cf complex visual images of animals and inanimate objects 
and secondly, cf verbal images. This is obviously, due to the greater vici­
nity of Ihe seccnd signal image to the notion. It is interesting to point out, 
furthermore, that in erroneous verbal account the patients which have 
understood the need of establishing a regular liaison between a group of 
stimuli and type of reaction, become mistakenly “ conscious”  of this relation­
ship and thereby produce generalized groups on the basis of not essential 
or even not existing signs, eventually received from an individual stimulus, 
referred to the entire group. It is worth to note that in this case, the exami­
nees virtually, react to the true generalization of ideas (of which, however, 
they are unconscious) and by no means to the grouping of stimuli, not cor­
responding to reality and performed during the verbal account (for instance, 
plants are identified with foodstuff although, among them there are also 
guelder rose, birch and the like; the stimuli are grouped by the noun gender 
although, in practice, their meaning essence is reacted to; the visual images 
are grouped by colours, the verbal — by phcnetical peculiarities and so on). 
Hence, “subconsciously” not merely elementary, temporary associations 
might be produced between a specific stimulus (for instance, a bell) and a 
simple act (for instance, pressing the button), but also rather complex men­
tal processes of analysis and synthesis, reasoning and deduction might be 
performed.
Of still greater interest is the last group of 25 patients with which, during 
the verbal account it was established that the corresponding conditioned 
reflex was developed without finding expression in the necessary verbal- 
expressive or motor reactions in the course of the experimental investigation 
proper. In some of the patients we are prone to accept that the conditioned 
reflex was developed at the end of the testing session (in similar cases, the 
examinees usually state that they “ only now” have understood what they 
were expected to do or say). More frequently, anyway, the patients state in 
their verbal account that they have reacted in an indispensable pattern, 
clearly formulating the drafted by the experimentator temporary association, 
regardless of the fact that during the examination, their responses have 
been “ arbitrary” , choatic. In this case the interference should be assumed 
of two defective mechanisms: on one hand, the developed in the second sign­
al system temporary association does not find adequate expression in the 
response reaction; on the other, the possibility for control byway of opposite 
association is impaired — the patient fails to become conscious of his own 
reactions correctly. This is an indication that the dissociation between the 
functions of the two signal systems might be two-fold: not merely the processes 
in the first signal system might remain outside the conscious perception, but 
the formation of new temporary associations might be accomplished at 
the level of the second signal system, without this inducing an adequate 
reflex in the first signal system and in the subcortical motor mechanisms. 
Moreover, the patient might be unconscious or mistakenly conscious of his 
own speech-expressive reactions.
And yet, the barrier between the conscious and unconscious is by no means 
unsurmountable. It is emphasized, on the basis of personal experience that
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with long-term investigation and adequate allusion on behalf of the 
experimentator, the unconscious could easily become conscious, and the 
errors made accordingly corrected.
The pathopsychological observations reported might have an essensial 
bearing not merely on psychopathology, but on general psychology as well. 
It is sufficient to make analogy between the data herein reported and cer­
tain characteristic features of psychic life during sleep to find out that they 
are inherent not merely to the state of schizophrenic “ splitting” .
Thus, outside the field of clear consciousness new conditioned associations, 
comprising also conditioned-conditioned second signal associations (which 
are the basis of the inductive conclusion), might be accomplished. On the 
other hand, the failure in realization of response reactions is possible in 
properly developed complex associations. In our opinion, the latter fact 
is not an indication that an independent unconscious category is formed. 
Not being conscious of the conditioned reflex as a whole or of single 
elements of the same constitutes merely a step in the process of developing 
complex conditioned reflexes, its lower phase, which in conformity with 
rule, proceeds into the stage of conscious state. The passage of the social 
experience, accumulated and concentrated within the respective cerebral 
traces, from the unconscious to conscious and vice versa — this is a per­
petual dynamic equilibrium on which our psychic life is based.
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О ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ НЕОСОЗНАВАНИЯ ПРОЦЕССОВ 
В ПРЕДЕЛАХ ВТОРОЙ СИГНАЛЬНОЙ СИСТЕММ
Вл. Иванов 
Р Е З Ю М Е
Проведено исследование 230 больних параноидной шизофренией при 
помощи собственной методики для образования условних рефлексов 
с участием второй сигнальной системи. На основании некоторих из полу- 
ченних результатов, автор делает внвод, что создание нових, в том чн- 
сле и сложних условно-условньгх второсигнальних связей, может проис- 
ходить и вне поля ясното сознания. С другой сторони, при правильно 
образованних сложних связях, могут остаться нереализовани ответ- 
ние реакции. Зги явления толкуются не как формирование отдельной 
категории бессознательного, а как зтап, как более низшая стадия в про- 
цессе образования сложних условних рефлексов, которие закономерно 
переходят в стадию осознавания.
